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1 We acknowledge that ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ are
It is the nature of unidentiﬁed bodies however that
unclear, and that the legal obligations of states conc
are the same regardless of that legal status. As such, f
we will use the terms interchangeably.
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The paper explores how the management of migrant bodies by national and EU authorities reﬂects
particular understandings of contemporary borders and how the failure to address such bodies has
implications far from the frontier. The study of the management both of the dead and of the data that can
serve to identify missing migrants, can beneﬁt our understanding of the contemporary border, and has to
date received only limited scholarly attention. To address this gap we draw on ﬁeld research carried out
on the Greek island of Lesbos, one of the key migrant entry points to the EU, that has seen repeated
incidents of deadly shipwrecks. Based on interviews with families of migrants and local stakeholders the
paper explores how death at the border introduces novel e and often invisible e borders and categories
of inclusion and exclusion. By shedding light on the experiences of the families of the dead we aspire to
introduce a critical set of actors who have been marginalized from the study of the border. In exploring
the remote effects of deaths on such families in migrant countries of origin, the paper shows that
bordering practices have transnational impacts at the human level, thereby broadening our conceptu-
alization of the border.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent decades thousands of migrants and refugees have died
or gone missing in their efforts to cross the Mediterranean and
enter the European Union (EU) often using ﬂimsy boats (Last &
Spijkerboer, 2014).1 Although accurate ﬁgures are still unavai-
lable, reﬂecting an entrenched policy of the EU and its member
states to decline to quantify the phenomenon of migrant deaths,
according to a report published by the International Organization
for Migration (IOM), between 2000 and 2014 the estimated total
number of deaths at the EU borders was 22,400 (Brian & Laczko,
2014), while ofﬁcially recorded deaths at the EU border in the
period 1990e2014 totalled 3188 persons (Last & Spijkerboer, 2014).
It is clear that this latter ﬁgure does not reﬂect the actual number ofas), simon.robins@york.ac.uk
two distinct legal categories.
their status prior to death is
erning those human remains
or the purposes of this paper
r Ltd. This is an open access articledeaths but rather illustrates the lack of systematic recording of
statistics concerning deaths at sea (Last, 2015). In 2015, 3772 are
known to have died crossing the Mediterranean, constituting 70%
of global migrant deaths that year,2 with an additional untold
number of unrecorded deaths.
Shipwrecks with high numbers of casualties have made the
headlines in European media and have brieﬂy transformed the
discourse around Mediterranean migration from one concerned
with the threat to Europe, to humanitarian concerns. Yet typically
the focus of international media and the resulting political atten-
tion wanes just days after such deaths are reported. One result of
this is that both policy-makers and academics focus exclusively on
the phenomena circumscribing shipwrecks, such as smugglers,
rescue, push-backs etc, and ideological, institutional or structural
aspects of border policies. This paper seeks to ask three important
and interrelated questions. First, what happens to the bodies of
would be migrants who die on their journey across the Mediter-
ranean? Second, how do states at the EU border deal with this
unprecedented humanitarian challenge amidst a policy void at2 IOM (2015) Missing Migrants' Project: Latest Global Figures e Migrant Fatal-
ities Worldwide, Available at: http://missingmigrants.iom.int/latest-global-ﬁgures.
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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practical challenges that the families of missing and dead migrants
face in their effort to ﬁnd their loved ones?
Studying the novel and complex humanitarian problem of
migrant bodies at the border is important for several reasons. First,
it is critical in exploring how death at the border introduces novel
forms of inclusion and exclusion. The study of the contrasting
policies deployed by state authorities to deal with dead migrants
and dead EU citizens can shed light on the enduring impact of the
border on migrant bodies even after their death. This represents an
alternative approach to studying the intersection of borders with
security and human rights.
Second, for every body that is washed ashore at the EU border,
there is a family living with ambiguity, not knowing if their loved
one is dead or alive. For such families their loved ones are missing,
having left home and never having been heard from since. In the
absence of information about the fate of loved ones, families cannot
start the mourning process and live forever with uncertainty (Boss,
2006). Where can a family receive information about a relativewho
may have died while seeking tomigrate?Where death is conﬁrmed
and families seek to learn where a body is buried, what processes
are required to manage both bodies and data to ensure identiﬁca-
tion? In addressing these questions, our approach deviates from the
Eurocentric framing of the ‘refugee crisis’, focusing exclusively on
the EU (spatial) border and shaped by security concerns. By
exploring the effect on families of the dead and missing in states of
migrant origin, we highlight how these bordering practices often
have transnational and emotional impacts that transcend the EU
boundaries. Hence, our approach to of combining ofﬁcial policy
responses and the situation of families of the missing seeks to
provide a more complete account of how death introduces novel,
and often invisible, borders. This is one of the ﬁrst papers to sys-
tematically collect data in one of the states most impacted by
migrant bodies at its borders, namely Greece, in an effort to map
and critically evaluate policy approaches.
In what follows, we brieﬂy discuss the management of dead
bodies in the Greek island of Lesbos, which has experienced a large
number of deadly shipwrecks.We then identify gaps in the relevant
literature and explain why the management of migrant bodies at
the EU frontier has received so little attention in both policy dis-
cussions and mainstream academic literature.
2. Death as the border
Building on insights drawn from thework of Judith Butler (2004,
2009) we explore how death at the EU border introduces novel and
parallel borders. In what follows we seek to make a number of
contributions. First, we expand thematically the study of borders to
understand new forms of inclusion and exclusion introduced by
what we call death as the border. A border spatially demarcates
politically sovereign lives (i.e. citizens from aliens) while death
creates a new border which separates families from loved ones.
Hence, studying the simultaneous management of the living and
the dead at the border sheds light on the continued relevance of the
border even after death.
Second, we challenge the EU-centric approach to the study of
the border, confronting a political focus on migrants as a security
threat with the impact of deaths at the border on the families of
migrants far from it. Deaths at the border have transnational po-
litical, psychological and social effects on families in migrant
countries of origin. Hence, the border is deﬁned not only in spatial,
geographical, or political terms. It has also a strong emotional
component: its presence has an affective impact far away. The
struggle of families to cope with the lack of clarity of the fate of
their loved ones not only remains invisible but becomes apermanent and dominant feature of their daily lives. The corpse
problematizes the relationship between the securitization of the
border, the experience of the human bodies that (attempt to) cross
the border, and those with an emotional link to the border crossers.
As the policing of bodies, rather than merely of spatial borders, has
become a principal doctrine in recent decades, we shift our atten-
tion to the corporeal dimension, building on a growing trend in the
literature (Andrijasevic, 2010; Coleman & Stuesse, 2014; Pugliese,
2009).
Finally, our contribution is methodological. While most analyses
focus either on the authorities or on individuals at the site of
refugee arrival, we combine both perspectives by mapping the
range of ofﬁcial policy responses to the management of the dead
coupled with the experiences of families in search of their loved
ones. To this end, we focus on the uneasy experience of dealing
with migrant bodies. The fact that a performative understanding of
the border (Salter, 2011) sees the frontier constructed from the
bodies of migrants and the trauma of their family members, sug-
gests that the study of the phenomenon of missing migrants can
shed analytical and critical light on the contemporary border. As an
NGO activist stressed,
‘the dead (migrants) are themost appalling spectacle I have ever
seen, because I visualized the death and what it means not to be
able to cross the border. So, the theoretical framework about
walls, securitization, acquires a new dimension when you see
decomposed bodies. Even more tragic is the fact that you cannot
bury them as they deserved to be buried and that no one could
identify them (Interview #12).
To illustrate ‘death as the border’ we focus on three key dis-
tinctions, or themes, emerging from the situation in Lesbos to
explore how the management of the dead at the border introduces
parallel, yet often unnoticed borders. An emphasis on the man-
agement of living as opposed to dead migrants and the signiﬁcant
effects of this distinction; the (in)visibility of the families of the
dead; and the ofﬁcial characterisation of dead migrant bodies as
evidence of crime rather than an understanding of the dead body as
an object of mourning by loved ones.
3. The experience of Lesbos
The Greek island of Lesbos is located in the Aegean Sea at its
Eastern border with Turkey and the island's proximity toTurkey has
made it a major destination for migrants and refugees, ﬂeeing
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and more recently Syria, to cross
into the EU. In 2015 it became the most frequented route for
informal migration into the EU, surpassing that between North
Africa and Lampedusa. Although complete data are still absent, in
2015 Lesbos received more than 500,000 refugees and migrants
(Brian & Lazcko, 2015; UNHCR, 2015). Beyond such abstract data,
the direct experience of deadly shipwrecks is shocking to the local
population in Lesbos; a local journalist recalled that ‘I have seen
corpses before in my career, but what I experienced in the big
shipwreck of 15th of December 2012, it's something unprece-
dented. That was a war scene… ten dead bodies were lying on the
shore’ (Interview #10).
This drives the selection of Lesbos as a case study to explore
state responses to the phenomenon of dead migrants. Over three
periods of ﬁeldwork, in July 2013, in MarcheApril 2015, and Sep-
tembereDecember 2015 we interviewed local stakeholders,
including coast guards, local coroners, municipal authorities, NGO
workers, and members of migrant communities on the island, as
well as policy-makers in Athens. This was coupled with semi-
structured interviews with families of dead and missing migrants
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for their loved ones, as well as survivors of the journey to Lesbos.
The vast majority of the families of missing and dead migrants
who visit Lesbos in search of bodies or information about missing
loved ones do so for a very short-term period, often for only a few
days after a shipwreck. This coupled with their vulnerable
emotional state when searching for their loved ones raised an
insurmountable ethical concern and ruled out the prospect of
interviewing them during their visit to the island. To overcome
these problems we pursued two paths. First, a researcher working
on the island who had already built relationships of trust with a
number of families after helping them in their search or missing
loved ones was recruited. As most families had moved to their
country of origin or other EU countries they were interviewed
several months after the traumatic experience to minimize the
prospect of retraumatization. As a result of this strategy the ma-
jority of interviews were taken in the country of origin (i.e. Tunisia)
or over the phone or on skype. Second, another researcher collected
interviews in Tunisia from families of dead and missing migrants.
Although most of the Tunisian families lost their loved ones while
traveling to Italy (not Lesbos), they face similar challenges
emotionally, psychologically and socially. Hence this set of in-
terviews helps us highlight the transnational effects of death at the
EU border. The majority of interviews were semi-structured in an
effort to enable participants to express their views and experiences
on the subject. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic and the
insecure legal status of some respondents, all interviewees cited are
anonymized or given pseudonyms.
A visit to the cemetery in Lesbos where most dead migrants are
buried is shocking, yet revealing (photo 1). In the graveyard one
ﬁnds bodies covered with earth and no headstone to identify the
dead. The only markers are broken stones e often recycled from
older graves e on which is written the purported nationality of the
deceased, a number, and a date. Since most bodies are unidentiﬁed,
this nationality is typically based on an informed guess or infor-
mation from survivors, rather than from established facts
(Interview #11). As a local priest aptly put it ‘these people become a
number in the cemetery of Mytilene’, the capital of Lesbos
(Interview #25). To shed light on this phenomenon we embarked
on a study to trace the processes followed by local authorities in the
aftermath of a deadly shipwreck, with speciﬁc emphasis on the
management of the dead bodies of migrants, including the collec-
tion, identiﬁcation, burial and repatriation of remains.
A central ﬁnding is that there is a ‘grey zone’ around the man-
agement of migrant bodies, in which the obligations andresponsibilities of a range of actors are ill-deﬁned, enmeshed in
legal and bureaucratic ambiguity. The coast guard maintained that
their responsibility is limited to collecting the dead body and
transporting it to the hospital, after which responsibility lies with
the district attorney (Interview #18). The district attorney in
practice assumes only a marginal role, typically declining any
substantive investigation on the assumption that death was not
caused by criminal activity, and then signing the relevant docu-
mentation to permit burial (Interview #28). The body remains at
the local hospital with the coroner, whose duty is limited to the
examination of the corpse to establish the cause of death and carry
out the autopsy (Interview #23). When asked about the next steps,
the coroner had no answer; he only revealed that a swift burial was
necessary, as the hospital has no facilities to store bodies for more
than a few days. The director of social services at the hospital
informed us there is no budget available for burying dead ‘illegal’
migrants, only for treating living migrants (Interview #24). There is
no standardized procedure to deal with a migrant body, and this
policy vacuum legitimizes local authorities in denying their legal
and moral responsibility to address the issue of identiﬁcation. Most
often relevant data found on the body e documents, tattoos, other
identifying marks e are not systematically collected, analysed and
stored to support identiﬁcation. Similarly, only a limited effort is
made to collect other information e such as testimony from sur-
vivors of a shipwreck e that could advance this goal.
Whilst Greek bureaucracy is subject to an entrenched culture of
‘blame avoidance’ (Dimitrakopoulos, 2001) this is exacerbated by
the deep social, political and economic crisis, with Greek civil ser-
vants reluctant to assume any responsibilities beyond those clearly
articulated. A local doctor who offers medical aid to incoming mi-
grants argued ‘It is certain that there are no accountability pro-
cedures to ensure that civil servants are doing their work properly,
while they believe that it is not their responsibility to deal with the
problem’ (Interview #12).
Despite migrant deaths being a persistent phenomenon in
recent years, dealing with shipwrecks takes place on an ad hoc
basis; no standardized procedure has been established. Even
members of the Greek bureaucracy admit this absence of long-term
preparedness. At a visit to the local hospital a staff member argued
that ‘although the hospital is obliged to design an emergency plan
for humanitarian or natural disasters (i.e. earthquakes, ﬂoods),
which could have included immigrants, this has never happened’
(Interview #1). This ineffectiveness of the Greek state combined
with the intrinsic complexity of the phenomenon has made this
policy vacuum evenmore apparent. The Head of the Greek ofﬁce of
UNHCR highlighted this issue: ‘there is a gap in dealing with this
problem, and there is a need to create a policy mechanism that
would respond more effectively to incidents of shipwrecks, and
facilitate relatives to ﬁnd their loved ones’ (Interview #21). Despite
repeated calls from high-ranking policy-makers for attention to this
issue, to date research has failed to produce empirical evidence that
could drive policymaking in accommodating the humanitarian
needs of the victims.
4. Migrants deaths: lost in the literature
Although the growing phenomenon of deadly shipwrecks in the
Mediterranean constitutes a complex humanitarian crisis, the ac-
ademic literature has made limited efforts to explore the man-
agement of the dead and the consequences of failing to do so. This
can be partly attributed to the novel nature of the phenomenon; as
time passes more attention will be paid to fully explore the many
facets of this humanitarian disaster. For example, legal scholars
have shed light on legal and normative perspectives of deaths at sea
(Grant, 2015; Spijkerboer, 2013).
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dead and the phenomenon of missing migrants also reﬂects a more
fundamental methodological ﬂaw in the literature, which priori-
tizes certain levels of analysis (and thereby speciﬁc aspects of the
refugee crisis) over others. For example, the majority of such
literature emphasises the EU and member-states’ ofﬁcial policy
responses to ‘migrant’ ﬂows, including surveillance technologies
(Topak, 2014), border policing and ‘push-backs’ (Bialasiewicz, 2012;
Bigo, 2014), and the role of ‘smuggling networks’ (Triandafyllidou
and Maroukis, 2012). This very much reﬂects e if sometimes crit-
ically e the securitization agenda of concerned states. Even the
most insightful perspectives from ‘critical’ security studies, by
focusing primarily on state discourses, actions and omissions, have
side-lined victims' own experiences, with a few notable exceptions
(e.g. Squire, 2014). In a similar vein, human rights organisations and
international relief agencies have failed to provide a comprehensive
account of the needs of the families, who beyond the dead them-
selves are the principle victims of the neglect of migrant bodies.
Indeed, the families of those dead andmissingewith the exception
of a few high proﬁle cases e are entirely invisible in approaches to
the phenomenon.
Most importantly, by focusing primarily on state responses
which are localised at the border most analyses provide a static
picture of a very ﬂuid phenomenon, the consequences of which
extend well beyond EU borders. Whilst the direct victims of the
phenomenon are all too visible on Europe's beaches, the indirect
victims are those waiting for news from a loved one who has
migrated. Crucially, investigating the remote impacts of deaths that
extend to migrants' countries of origin, provides a larger picture
and sheds light on the transnational impact of the border on the
lives of thousands of families of dead and missing migrants.
To fully explore the phenomenon we build on theoretical in-
sights from the work of Judith Butler and Giorgio Agamben. These
frameworks inform particular aspects of the issue, yet each alone is
insufﬁcient to account for this complex phenomenon.
Critical border studies has increasingly turned to both Foucault's
biopolitics and Agamben's concept of bare life, understood as what
remains when human existence is stripped of the encumbrances of
social location and bereft of the qualiﬁcations of political inclusion
and belonging (Agamben,1998). Politics for Agamben is an ongoing
tension between inclusion and exclusion, between forms of life that
the sovereign will protect and represent and those it will not: this
deﬁnes the meaning of what it is to be human and thereby dis-
tinguishes an excess, the migrant as something other than human,
which cannot be made sense of in terms of the nation-state. This
prescription resonates with how the EU and its member states treat
migrants at their borders. Often in critical border studies Agam-
ben's framework is reduced to an understanding of mere ‘exclusion’
while its power lies precisely in that bare life revolves around the
zone of in distinction between ‘outside and inside, exclusion and
inclusion’ that is created by sovereign power (Agamben, 1998: 91).
The liminality of bare life coincides with the undocumented mi-
grant's effort to negotiate both border and sovereignty, conﬁned to
a status without even the ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1951:177),
evenwhenwithin the borders of an entity such as the EU. Sovereign
power in contemporary Europe lets migrants die at the border by
framing their deaths as accidents, unrelated to the machinery of
militarization and securitization that accompanies those deaths
(Albahari, 2006).
Agamben portrays the refugee as the ultimate biopolitical sub-
ject, and bare life as demonstrating the futility of seeking to
represent political subjectivity in terms of state, nation and terri-
tory (Owens, 2009). As Agamben has described for living refugees,
the bodies of the missing become a part of the legal order precisely
through their constitutive exclusion (Agamben, 1998). Such anapproach does, however, provide only a partial account of the
phenomenon of deaths at the border. By offering a Manichean view
of sovereign power, it deprives migrants and their families of the
possibility of agency, condemning then to the ‘complete embrace of
bare life’ (Edkins & Pin-Fat, 2004: 17) and, as such, it leaves un-
addressed important, yet not easily detectable, processes taking
place at the grassroots e in contexts of both migrant arrival and
departure. Agamben's emphasis on the state of exception in which
the refugee ﬁnds herself denies refugees as subjects of political
action and as capable of acts of resistance to sovereign power
(Huysmans, 2008). In the refugee camp, perceived as the
emblematic space of exception, Agamben's approach neglects the
political acts of hunger strikes, lip sewing or ethical practices by
solidarity groups that nuance this view (Owens, 2009: 573; Sigona,
2015). Most importantly, for the study of dead bodies, Agamben
appears to deny that the migrant body can be political, whereas we
see the very existence of the body and its presence at the border as
a product of politics and, as Verdery has shown (2000), the corpse
itself as a political subject. The migrant body appears to have
agency; such bodies can both nourish and haunt the living,
animating the social and political processes around death and
challenging the body as purely an object of politicisation. Beyond
the affective impacts of the dead body, i.e. those that touch people
emotionally, attachment to the dead and in particular to certain
bodies e particularly where they are absent e gives them power
over the living (Borneman, 2014).
To this end, Judith Butler's framework sets the stage for a more
nuanced discussion of how the dead body and its particular
‘vulnerability’ can beneﬁt our understanding of the border. Butler
raises important questions: ‘who counts as human? Whose lives
count as lives? And, ﬁnally, what makes for a grievable life?’
(2004:20). Butler explores the power relations and norms that
construct our understanding of what makes some lives grievable
and others open to continued vulnerability and precarity, even after
death. This is a useful analytical lens to approach both state au-
thorities' policy responses and the experiences of families of dead
migrants. Butler calls on us to ‘critically evaluate … the conditions
under which certain humans are more grievable than others’
(2004:30), and identiﬁes moments of loss and grief as critical in
determining who counts as human (2004). A number of studies
have drawn on Butler's insights to explore the impact of the border
(e.g. Hodge, 2015; Mountz, 2015). Drawing on Butler, Mountz
suggests ‘that if we fail to understand lives as liveable, we fail to
understand them as being lost or injured’ (Mountz, 2015:188).
Hence, those that are not valued in life, are by extension not
grievable after death; this is a valuable compass to guide us through
the unchartered ﬁelds of the management of dead bodies at the
border.
5. Living and dead migrants: a novel form of exclusion
Themost important innovation of the border is that it serves as a
tool of inclusion (for the in-group, largely citizens) but at the same
time excludes the rest of humanity. Paasi (2011:62) argues that
‘bordering separates and brings together. Borders allow certain
expressions of identity and memory to exist while blocking others’.
As Green (2012:576) puts it, ‘borders always involve a form of
classiﬁcation and categorization of the world’. On Lesbos this en-
tails an additional novel distinction between living and dead
(would-be) border crossers. Butler helps us shed light on this
distinction. The dead bodies of would-be border crossers are
framed as non-grievable by state authorities, and subject to almost
no attention, while living migrants are perceived as a potential
security threat and constantly surveyed. The dead ‘cannot be
mourned because they are always lost …. the derealisation of the
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spectral’ (Butler, 2004:53).
A range of speciﬁc labels is ascribed to living migrants, such as
‘illegal’, ‘undocumented’, ‘minor’, and ‘asylum seeker’, which drive
policy approaches. Administrative procedures around ‘undocu-
mented’ migrants are thorough, while the responsibility for
enforcing these procedures lies with central government. This is
integral to the broader securitization discourse circumscribing
migration: as living migrants are regarded as a ‘threat’ to national
security (Karyotis, 2012) and are subject to more surveillance than
perhaps any other category of person. By contrast, dead migrants
are ignored and the management of their bodies circumscribed by
legal and bureaucratic ambiguity. Migrant deaths are seen as a
mere accidental deviation from the (securitization) norm, and their
management is ill deﬁned, defaulting to local authorities. This is not
unique to Greece; a similar situation is also evident in Lampedusa
(Zagaria, 2012:18). Interviews with political elites and policy-
makers showed they had little familiarity with the problem,
including one senior policymaker at the GreekMinistry of Justice in
Athens, tasked to deal with human rights, who admitted ‘I do not
know what is the standard practice or if there is a practice that it is
followed at the borders’ (Interview #7).
Echoing this ‘logic of security’, the central government collects
and publishes detailed statistics of living migrants who enter the
sovereign territory of an EU state. In contrast, there is an almost
complete absence of data concerning migrant deaths; as Stefanie
Grant has aptly put it ‘there is an acute lack of accurate e or often
any e information about these deaths’ (Grant, 2015:9) consistent
with the overarching logic that they are ‘accidents’, the EU and its
member states do not maintain a record of these deaths. This is
analytically important. As Andreas and Greenhill have argued ‘If
there are no ‘data’, an issue or problem will not be recognized,
deﬁned, prioritized, put on the agenda, and debated.’(Andreas &
Greenhill, 2011:1). Evidence from one of the most comprehen-
sive efforts to compile data based on death registries in Greece,
Spain, Italy and Malta suggests that only a very small fraction of
deaths are recorded, and only around half of these are identiﬁed
(Last, 2015). The result is that very large numbers of deadmigrants
are ofﬁcially and formally entirely invisible while considered
missing by families who continue to search for their loved ones
(Last, 2015).
Integral to the logic which frames the death of migrants as an
‘accident’ is that burial is seen as an act of benevolence, rather than
an act of justice or a moral obligation on the part of the state, and
unrelated to any obligation an authority may have to inform rela-
tives of the death. Although there is a speciﬁc budget allocated by
the EU and the Greek state to care for living migrants at Greek
hospitals, there is no allocated budget (from the state or EU) to
cover expenses associated with the burial of dead migrants
(Interview #24). To organize a burial the (former) mayor of Lesbos
had to raise funds from local sponsors or ‘beg local ofﬁces orga-
nizing funeral services to give us the cofﬁns’ (Interview #22). At
times, migrant communities in Athens and local NGOs collect
money to pay for cofﬁns (Interview #19, #20). In this way, an
already ambiguous policy becomes both arbitrary and privatised. In
an interview with the mayor of Lesbos, he deﬂected any legal re-
sponsibility for the burial of dead migrants, arguing ‘I do not know
what happens with the management of the dead, because the
municipality is not the competent authority to deal with it’
(Interview #2). Evidence of this blame avoidance is seen in the fact
that local funeral services, which have been requested to carry out
burials of migrants on behalf of the city council in the past, have not
been reimbursed and as a result have recently brought a case to
court (Interview #9).
A visit to the cemetery in Lesbos revealed the graves of migrantsto be unmarked except for a broken stone containing a date of
death and the purported nationality of the dead. Procedural am-
biguity, driven by the effort to avoid blame, ensures that no local
agency assumes responsibility for the burial of migrant bodies.
Even local NGOs mobilized around migrants’ rights are unaware as
to which is the designated authority to carry out such burials
(Interview #11, #6).
Greek law does not have a speciﬁc provision for the burial of
unidentiﬁed migrants. In the absence of a speciﬁc regulatory
framework (lex specialis) the general laws and regulations con-
cerning the dead apply, irrespective of their nationality. Under
Greek law, local municipalities are exclusively responsible for the
establishment and proper functioning of cemeteries:
‘Cemeteries are destined for the burial of all the dead, irre-
spective of religion or nationality. Municipalities and commu-
nities are obliged to grant to the cemeteries in their jurisdiction
space for the burial of every dead person, parishioner or not, and
of every other person having died in their prefecture, irre-
spective of whether the dead was a Greek national or a
foreigner, Christian or not.’ (Law 582/1968, art. 6.)
Interestingly, the authority tasked to manage the local cem-
etery does not even maintain a map of the graves in the cemetery
(Interview #8). This, coupled with the efforts of local authorities
to deﬂect responsibility, leaves funeral services carrying out the
messy business of burial, and in several cases having the mo-
nopoly of knowledge about the speciﬁc location of particular
bodies, an essential piece of data if those bodies are ever to be
identiﬁed. By subcontracting the responsibility for burial to a
non-state actor the authorities not only deliberately deny their
legal duties, but, most signiﬁcantly, make it impossible to
determine if standardized procedures are followed, such as
whether a tag with vital information is placed on each body
buried (Interview #29).
Illustrative of the distinction between living and dead mi-
grants is the contrast between efforts to identify living migrants
and the absence of interest in identifying dead bodies. According
to a Greek coroner, while the identiﬁcation rate for the bodies of
Greek citizens is almost 97% e an exceptional rate even by in-
ternational standards e for migrants this rate is approximately
20% (Interview #29). This can partly be attributed to the fact that
timing is of the essence in identifying dead bodies. In cases
where no one claims a body in the ﬁrst days after death, a critical
window of opportunity is missed and subsequently it becomes
far more difﬁcult to make an identiﬁcation. The passage of time
affects \ the condition of the dead body, and inhibits visual
identiﬁcation by relatives, which is the most common form of
conﬁrmation of identity. Most signiﬁcantly, as illustrated below,
once the unidentiﬁed body is buried in a common grave it be-
comes almost impossible to identify it.
The leader of a NGO in the neighbouring island of Chios re-
members the story of a relativewho took the decision to travel from
Australia a year and a half after a deadly shipwreck to search for the
body of his brother. ‘[W]ewent through a very complicated process.
We found the ﬁle at the coast guard, we then went to the funeral
service and nobody knew where he was buried. We started asking
the priests at local cemeteries […] at last we found a gravedigger
who hurriedly buried him, but didn't remember exactly the loca-
tion. Then we brought an excavator and a mass grave was revealed
without any signs, nothing. And that was the common procedure’
(Interview #17). The mingling of human remains in this way, and
the refusal to isolate and record individual burials recalls the chaos
of Bosnia's mass graves, the result of a conscious effort to prevent
identiﬁcation.
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A principle driver of the failure to effectively manage the bodies
of dead migrants is the invisibility and marginality of bodies found
at the border. As Judith Butler argues ‘there are radically different
ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across
the globe. Certain lives are highly protected… Other lives will not
ﬁnd such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as
‘grievable’ (2004:32). Butler provides a theoretical backdrop
against which we can explore the continued invisibility and mar-
ginality of the dead bodies of migrants. International relief agencies
and NGOs, sympathetic or opposing political parties and interna-
tional media have mobilized around the needs or perils of living
migrants, yet a similar mobilization around the dead or missing is
absent. Individual incidents of deadly shipwrecks have attracted
signiﬁcant media attention, perfectly illustrated by the death of the
3-year old Aylan Kurdi (Withnal, 2015). Still, there has been no
follow up, mobilization or political process to highlight this aspect
of the refugee crisis or to make visible the families of the dead.
This raises a paradox. The dead body has historically been an
exceptionally powerful symbol of mobilization. Antigone's claim to
the digniﬁed obligation to the dead served as a tool of resistance to
state authority, while the mothers of the disappeared in Argentina
created one of the most powerful human rights movements around
the search for their loved ones (Brysk, 1995). Along these lines,
Butler argues that ‘grief… furnishes a sense of political community
of complex order’, adding that making ‘grief into a resource for
politics, is not to be resigned to inaction, but it may be understood
as the slow process by which we develop a point of identiﬁcation
with suffering itself’ (Butler, 2004:30). However, despite the large
number of deaths at the EU's shores and powerful images of the
dead that have beenwidely disseminated, no suchmobilization has
occurred.
The distinguishing feature ofmigrant deaths is that they occur at
the border. Most theoretical frameworks around social movements
and contentious politics focus on the presence of opportunities for
collective action; the framework is built on the premise that even
for the marginal there are routes to action (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly,
1995). For the families of missing and dead migrants however
such opportunities for mobilization are simply absent. Their (il)
legal status in the EU, their inability to exert any political inﬂuence,
their dispersion across a range of states and continents, and the
absence of culturally salient symbols to construct their mobiliza-
tion around their search for their loved ones all present obstacles.
As such, the border effectively annihilates opportunities for col-
lective mobilization around grief envisaged by Butler. Where
mobilization has occurred, such as among families of missing mi-
grants in Tunisia,3 the border remains an often insurmountable
barrier between families' need for truth and the states in a position
to address it.
Whilst this invisible status, coupled with the collapse of Greek
institutions, has provided opportunities for living migrants to
escape the total control of the border, for the families, invisibility is
the greatest obstacle. While some families have used social media
and other informal networks to access information about the fate of
loved ones, all must rely ultimately on ofﬁcial procedures to
conﬁrm death, identify a body, and return remains of loved ones. In
the absence of any perception of obligation on the part of author-
ities, it is however families who must take the initiative and seek
out a relevant authority, while authorities remain passive. Once a3 Mobilization of families of missing migrants in Tunisia is led by a NGO called
Terre pour Tous (‘Everybody's earth’) who have documented some elements of their
work, e,g. http://la.terre.est.pour.tous.over-blog.com/tunis/06/09/2013-information.family takes on the heavy burden of traveling to Greece to trace
their loved one, they are confronted by a number of legal,
bureaucratic and practical obstacles. They often do not have a legal
permit to enter the EU and as such it is not uncommon for their
arrival to be delayed or even denied. When a refugee with per-
manent resident status in Germany came to Lesbos in search of his
missing father ‘the port authority did not accept that his documents
were legal, and hewas stopped. When he tried to come through the
airport, he faced the same problem’ and a local NGO had to
convince the authorities to release him (Interview #11). As families
are the only ones who can visually identify dead migrants, these
bureaucratic obstacles often inhibit the only realistic opportunity to
identify the body.
Within this context of marginality and invisibility imposed by
the border, networks of exploitation thrive around the suffering of
the families. In the face of the failure of the authorities to identify
bodies, even in the unlikely event that a survivor informs families of
the dead in the country of origin, they cannot afford the cost of
repatriation of remains. Thus, while poor (living) migrants experi-
ence the greatest barriers (and dangers) in entering the EU, it is also
the poorest who face the greatest obstacles to repatriating remains
if a loved one dies making the journey. As a migrant interviewed in
Lesbos who has organized a number of funerals argued ‘Only the
rich get back, the poor stay here’ (Interview #19). Ironically, while it
is wealthy living migrants who have the greatest possibilities to
stay in the EU, it is the families of the poorest dead migrants who
see that their loved one must remain on EU territory forever. This
insight challenges the simplistic image of migrants (and their
families) as a homogenous unity. Even among refugees and mi-
grants there is a class element which co-exists with their identity as
border crossers. Hence, the study of this novel humanitarian phe-
nomenon sheds light on howabstract concepts such as sovereignty,
citizenship and the border create new dividing lines not only be-
tween the dead (citizens and non-citizen), but most interestingly
between dead and living migrants.
This raises another prevalent feature of the policy vacuum, the
repatriation of remains. Even if families are fortunate enough to
overcome all other bureaucratic obstacles and identify their rela-
tives, it is almost impossible to get the dead body back home. The
repatriation of the corpse is an extremely complicated and
expensive procedure (Interview #10). Precisely because families
have limited knowledge of Greek legal procedure and often hur-
riedly visit Greece with no legal status, they pay excessive amounts
of money to middlemenwho claim they can expedite the process. A
number of participants revealed that there is an established
‘network of proﬁt’, which often involves the smugglers (Interviews
#26, #27). A respondent from Afghanistan stated ‘They (smugglers)
are people that get money and make proﬁt from the deaths […]
They know how to deal with funeral services andwhen relatives try
to ﬁnd someone to help they get in contact with these people. They
don't usually ask for money from families but they take some
money from the funeral service, which overcharges the families. It
is all organized’ (Interview #30).
One of the key obstacles is that dead bodies often need to get
visa status to travel back home within an extremely tight time
frame as corpses must travel within days for sanitary reasons. A
Syrian relative remembers that ‘after the death we had to organize
the funeral. The ﬁrst thought was to take them back to Syria as our
family wanted that […] but the problem was taking the body back
to Syria, as Turkey requires a visa for the dead. The ambassador of
Turkey told me that they had to check the cofﬁn. The visa was
difﬁcult’ (Interview #27). Hence, after spending an exorbitant
amount of money to repatriate the body, the family took the de-
cision instead to bury their loved one in Athens.
As a result of these obstacles, over the past years only a handful
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signiﬁcant political or economic inﬂuence. For example, two mi-
grants currently living in Lesbos who have followed incidents of
shipwrecks remember one in which 22 migrants died; only two
bodies were repatriated largely because they were the relatives of
an Afghan minister who mobilized the Afghan embassy in Athens
(Interview#15). All other victimswere buried at the local cemetery.
Other migrants interviewed conﬁrmed the high cost of repa-
triation: ‘most frequently the family does not have the money to
bring them [bodies] back as the money is usually spent to pay the
smugglers’ (Interview#20). Hence, the border inhibits the efforts of
families to repatriate the remains of their loved ones but also drives
networks of exploitationwhich beneﬁt from the families' suffering.7. Tensions between the dead body as evidence of crime and
as a reference for mourning
One of the key tensions examined here is that between the
bodies of migrants as evidence of crime (the rhetoric of forensic
truth) and a particular body as a reference point for mourning and
the addressing of trauma (the rhetoric of memory). Whether the
bodies of those missing are considered objects of forensic investi-
gation that serve judicial purpose or are sacred relics of a loved one
that permit mourning determines which of these understandings is
prioritized. Death separates people from their loved ones in a more
profound way than the physical border and simple distance does;
where information is absent, death is perceived as an uncertain lack
of presence and creates an ambiguous space in which mourning is
impossible. The bodies of missing migrants represent a space of
conﬂict between different interests, including power, knowledge
and the sacred. The evidential approach will seek to emphasise the
past, while families will seek approaches that permit them to
address their present and their future, which will include the
identiﬁcation that transforms remains from an object into the relics
of a loved one.
Ambiguous loss, where a family member is psychologically
present, but physically absent, is ‘a situation of unclear loss
resulting from not knowing whether a loved one is dead or alive,
absent or present’ (Boss, 2004: 554). For many families of migrants
who die at the border ambiguous loss is a trauma generated by the
conﬂuence of death and the border as a divide that prevents not
only access to a migrant, living or dead, but access even to
knowledge of their death, leaving them caught between hope and
despair.
‘Whenmy son disappeared, I was lost in thought all the time and
looked for answers and explanations for his disappearance. I am
oscillating between believing that they are alive and admitting
that they are dead. After all, only God knows what is going on.’
(Interview 31)
This articulates the power of the border over both the migrant
and his or her family and its capacity to communicate trauma over
large distances. To end the trauma of ambiguity demands the cre-
ation of meanings for families that can only emerge from truth
about their loved one, and that can permit the rituals that allow the
dead to assume their proper place as a part of e albeit removed
from e family and community (Danforth, 1982). Families want to
know the truth and they want to be able to bury their loved ones if
they are dead:
‘Theymust tell us where our children are. The truth will comfort
us; I want him alive or dead. If they say that he's alive, they
should tell us in which place is he and if he is dead, we will beable to do our mourning, bury him, after all it is the will of god.’
(Interview #32)
Power relations that deny that dead migrants are grievable
intersect with the lack of knowledge of death that prevents families
mourning. The ambiguity of a family's loss emerges as a result of
the denial of grievability of migrants who die at the EU's border, e
an extension of their exclusion in life. As Butler states:
‘Do they have names and faces, personal histories, family,
favourite hobbies, slogans by which they live? […] After all, if
someone is lost, and that person is not someone, then what and
where is the loss, and how does mourning take place? (p.32)
Grief emerges from both the individual and collective meanings
given to events, just as the rituals that mark death seek to create
social understandings that bind someone to their community
whilst acknowledging they are no longer a part of it. As such, grief is
both built upon and demonstrates the relational ties that link
families, clans and communities. Mourning is an ethical re-
sponsibility of those close to the dead, and one denied to the rel-
atives of those missing, as described by Tunisian families:
‘They have to bring them back for us here whether they're dead
or alive. It's important, I wouldn't deny his fate, but in case my
son is dead, I'd like to bury him here and, at least, I'll be better
and I'd have a place where I can pray. Even bones, I'll bury them.
The cemetery is in front of my house. Every morning, I wake up
in front of it. I recite the Fatiha, I do this daily. I don't have any
hostility towards death. At least, if he's brought back to me, I'd
look through the window to see his grave and I'd say that he's
there.’ (Interview #33)
The inscription of the border on both the bodies of the dead and
the lives of their families can beneﬁt our understanding of the
ofﬁcial policies designed to respond to this problem and the fam-
ilies’ political grief.
Katherine Verdery (2000) has highlighted the symbolic capital
of human remains and how elites use graves to advance their po-
litical objectives. In the case of missing migrant graves it is the
public silence and the absence of political interest that make these
graves politically important. The question of ‘ownership of the dead
body’ is symbolically and politically important. Although historical
examples of confrontations and conﬂicts around dead bodies
abound, in the case of dead migrants their bodies are trapped on
the wrong ‘side’ of the border and thereby condemned to political
marginality. Death creates a new border which not only separates
migrants from their loved ones but that initiates the trauma of
ambiguous loss that becomes a permanent by-product of the
border on relatives' daily lives. Most families will never know the
truth, or recover the remains of their loved ones and must live with
the consequences of that.
‘I don't sleep any more, I have hallucinations and dark ideas. It's
like a crisis, I start wandering in the house and sometimes I hit
the furniture. I have disrupted sleep. I usually wake up at 3 in the
morning. There is a voice in my head telling me sometimes that
my son is dead, and sometimes I tell myself that he is alive. I feel
choked. I always think deeply and I usually feel afraid when I
stay alone. The medicines that were prescribed to me are too
strong; I can no longer wake up. I'm so tired because of all this,
you know.’ (Interview #34)
For the families each grave contains the remains of a personal
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receiving the body, however, the corpse serves ﬁrstly as a potential
tool of evidence in advancing a narrative that criminal re-
sponsibility for death lies with smugglers. In many EU states
investigation of migrant bodies is driven solely by a desire to
prosecute, and identiﬁcation of a body is only pursued if this will
advance such a prosecution. Secondly, the body is an object to be
managed for reasons of hygiene and propriety. Probably the best
illustration of the ofﬁcial approach to dead migrants is that of the
civil registries. The death certiﬁcate is a key document precisely
because state authorities certify that a person was a member of the
human community and after death grant a legal status to the body
that was denied in life, forever buried on Greek soil. The death
certiﬁcates of unidentiﬁed migrants perfectly illustrate that they
are not ‘grievable’ in Butler's terms, but drive only a bureaucratic
duty. The responsible registrar in Lesbos described the typical
process of preparing a death certiﬁcate of an unidentiﬁed migrant
buried in Mytilene:
‘The coroner informs us that he carried out the autopsy and
indicates the most probable date of death. Then he sends us (i.e.
the registry) an ofﬁcial document with a reference number.
Once we have prepared the death certiﬁcate we also use a new
reference number. Then we usually add a remark to the docu-
ment that this certiﬁcate was based on information provided by
the coroner's report, and it has a reference number, date etc’
(Interview #35)
Interestingly, death certiﬁcates usually narrate a very funda-
mental (ofﬁcial) story about a dead person, such as the date of birth
if s/he was married, if s/he had children. The certiﬁcate for the vast
majority of unidentiﬁed migrant deaths is overshadowed by their
invisible status, containing only the report of the coroner. This
captures the remote forensic and legal approach of the state, which
merely seeks to follow the legal and bureaucratic procedures. A
caveat is in order. This does not mean that all members of the civil
service are indifferent; to the contrary, the registrar we interviewed
showedmuch support for the families. In fact she led an initiative to
collect food and clothes for the living migrants (Interview #35). Yet,
feelings of grief or empathy are overshadowed by the bureaucratic
culture of blame avoidance.
The process of DNA collection from bodies best exempliﬁes both
the ‘forensic’ and bureaucratic approach of the authorities. The
coroner at the local hospital in Lesbos veriﬁed that a DNA sample is
taken and sent to the headquarters of the Forensic Science Division
(FSD) of the Greek police in Athens. An interview with the two
leading members of the FSD revealed that since 2007 the law has
obliged coroners to take DNA samples from all victims of ‘acci-
dents’, irrespective of their nationality and even where physical
identiﬁcation has been possible (Interview #4).4
It could be argued that this central collection of information
concerning individuals who would otherwise be anonymous to the
Greek state is tied to the embedded securitization regime, namely
to determine at a later date if a particular subject (e.g. a suspected
terrorist) is in fact dead. Yet, a closer tracing of the process reveals
that even this forensic approach is implemented poorly enough to
make the possibility of future identiﬁcations remote. The complete
lack of grievability is evident in the use of DNA and the failure in
practice to collect and store in a systematic way post-mortem data4 This is not however linked to the epidemic of migrant deaths at sea, but is a
response to the false identiﬁcation of two (Greek) victims of wildﬁres in the
summer of 2007, as a result of which the state has institutionalized the use of DNA
with all victims of accidents, including dead migrants.from shipwrecks.
For example, beyond DNA, local authorities tasked with dealing
with bodies, including the port authority, hospitals and the district
attorney have taken only minimal steps to collecting other post-
mortem data that would facilitate future identiﬁcation. According
to a local journalist, in the aftermath of a shipwreck coast guards
often neglect to collect critical evidence that migrants carry with
them, including mobile phones, notebooks or personal objects that
if systematically collected and stored could aid identiﬁcation
(Interview #10). An informed observer maintained that although
local coroners have the capacity to follow the Disaster Victims’
Identiﬁcation (DVI) protocol, a rigorous set of guidelines for post-
mortem autopsy set up by Interpol (2014), they rarely do
(Interview #29). This is crucial, as autopsy is the only opportunity
to provide an accurate description of bodies found, including in-
formation concerning jewellery, tattoos or other bodily marks, and
in this way facilitate future identiﬁcation. Yet, most coroners spent
little time making a comprehensive autopsy, especially in cases
where a DNA sample is taken.
Although the head of the Forensic Team of the police informed
us that families can send a DNA sample from the country of origin,
in only around 10% of deaths is such a sample received (Interviews
#4, #5). This is hardly surprising, as there is no outreach to states of
origin of migrants and minimal cooperation among different
agencies tasked to deal with different elements of the problem. For
example, local coast guards were not only unaware that this service
was available but were unsure whether a DNA sample was taken in
all cases (Interview #18). This is important, as the port authority in
Lesbos is the agency responsible for drafting and maintaining legal
ﬁles for cases of missing and unidentiﬁed migrants, as well as for
recording any developments in individual cases.
Most importantly, there is only minimal exchange with the
relevant forensic branch of the police tasked to match DNA sam-
ples, and with the municipal authorities responsible for the burial.
So, although the local coast guards are maintaining a ﬁle that
should include information on the precise gravesite for each un-
identiﬁed individual, in most cases this is not done because burial is
organized by a different local agency with very limited coordina-
tion. Hence, even if a family manages to overcome all the obstacles
discussed above and a DNA match is ﬁnally made, this does not
necessarily mean they will ﬁnd the whereabouts of their loved
ones, precisely because the identiﬁcation and the burial are
completely insulated processes, such that no one DNA sample can
be linked unambiguously to a particular buried body.
In sharp contract with this legal and forensic approach to the
dead body by state authorities, families' experience of loss and the
perception of the dead body is radically different. As Edkins has
shown, Western politics ‘misses the person’ (2011:2). Families
perceive the dead body as an object of mourning, and their struggle
is to make sense of the absence of their loved ones. The disap-
pearance of loved ones confronts those impacted by it with the
power of the border; power to not only deny life, but to deny even
access to conﬁrmation of death. As a result, power is embodied not
only in the very present absence of the bodies of missing migrants
but also in the minds and bodies of their families through trauma
and somatism. The missing, situated as they are between life and
death, assume a power of their own, something familiar made
unfamiliar as a result of the border. It is a deﬁning feature of those
missing that they resist the dichotomous classiﬁcation of present
versus absent, and it is this that most determines the experience of
their families, characterised by ambiguity and ambivalence. Deaths
at the EU's southern borders are a tragedy, but the politics of the
border that denies the value of those who die there constitutes a
second crisis whose victims are scattered throughout the migrant
producing states of Africa and the Middle East.
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Our analysis indicates that themanagement of migrant bodies at
EU's southern frontier reﬂects particular understandings of
contemporary borders and their biopolitics. This paper offers a
unique insight into the ‘refugee crisis’ in the Mediterranean. The
treatment of migrant bodies at the EU's southern frontier and the
experience of families with no information about missing loved
ones, drives the analytic lens of ‘death as the border’ to expand our
conceptualization of the border. It sheds light on the ‘logic of the
border’, which extends well beyond the physical frontier and the
living migrants crossing it, to determine the political afterlife of
dead migrants and their families. To highlight this we have intro-
duced an important new actor e the families of dead and missing
migrants. Our analysis reveals a key tension between state au-
thorities' responses to themanagement of the problem, guided by a
legal and ‘forensic logic’, and the families' approach, which expe-
rience a human body as a reference point for mourning and the
addressing of trauma. Although ofﬁcial policies include DNA
testing, limited efforts are made to identify individual bodies and
bury them in a digniﬁed way, thereby depriving families of the
capacity to mourn or bury loved ones. The result is that the bodies
of the dead are literally lost in a fog of bureaucratic ambiguity,
unmourned and uncounted. This highlights the transnational af-
fective impact of death at the border: death creates a new border as
a direct result of the presence of the physical frontier, which sep-
arates families from their relatives and even from news of dead
loved ones.
The paper also contributes to the growing debates on biopolitics,
by challenging the monolithic and often simplistic biopolitical
lenses which perceive dead bodies as lacking agency. Even Butler's
concept of grievability, which links the non-grievability of dead
migrants to the exclusion and marginality of the living, ultimately
sees no agency in the migrant body. This resonates with the
perception that the live migrant is the ultimate biopolitical subject,
while denying any subjectivity to both the bodies of the dead and
their families. Our analysis challenges this view by foregrounding
families' experiences and their approaches to mourning; from this
perspective, the dead body is itself a political subject, a symbol of
political and cultural contestation. For every common grave in the
Mediterranean there is a family which mourns, struggles, and often
takes political steps to ﬁnd the truth about their loved ones and
honour their remains. This is the political story of these deaths,
which often remains marginalized by perspectives which focus
almost exclusively on ofﬁcial authorities' responses.
Conﬂict of interest
None.
References
Agamben, G. (1998). Homo Sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Albahari, M. (2006). Death and the moral state: Making borders and sovereignty at the
southern edges of Europe. The center for comparative immigration studies. San
Diego: University of California. Working Paper 136.
Andreas, P., & Greenhill, K. M. (2011). Introduction: the politics of numbers. In
P. Andreas, & K. M. Greenhill (Eds.), Sex, drugs, and body counts: The politics of
numbers in global crime and conﬂict (pp. 1e22). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Andrijasevic, R. (2010). ‘Deported: the right to asylum at EU's external border of
Italy and Libya’. International Migration, 48(1), 148e174.
Arendt, H. (1951). The origins of totalitarianism. Orlando: Harvest.
Bialasiewicz, L. (2012). Off-shoring and out-sourcing the borders of Europe: Libya
and EU border work in the Mediterranean. Geopolitics, 17.4, 843e866.
Bigo, D. (2014). The (in) securitization practices of the three universes of EU border
control: military/navyeborder guards/policeedatabase analysts. Security Dia-
logue, 45(3), 209e225.
Borneman, J. (2014). Abandonment and victory in relations with dead bodies. InF. Stepputat (Ed.), Governing the dead. Manchester University Press.
Boss, Pauline (2004). Ambiguous loss research, theory, and practice: reﬂections
after 9/11. Journal of Marriage and Family, 66.
Boss, Pauline (2006). Loss, trauma, and resilience. In Therapeutic work with
ambiguous loss. New York, Norton.
Brysk, A. (1995). Hearts and minds: bringing symbolic politics back. Polity, 27(4),
559e585.
Brian, Tara, & Laczko, Frank (2014). Counting migrant deaths: an international
overview’. In T. Brian, & F. Laczko (Eds.), Fatal journeys ting lives lost during
migration (pp. 15e44). Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM).
Also available at: http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/FatalJourneys_
CountingtheUncounted.pdf.
Butler, J. (2004). Precarious life: The powers of mourning and violence. New York:
Verso.
Butler, J. (2009). Frames of war. New York: Verso.
Coleman, M., & Stuesse, A. (2014). Policing borders, policing bodies: the territorial
and biopolitical roots of US immigration control. In J. Reece, & C. Johnson (Eds.),
Placing the border in everyday life (pp. 33e65). London: Routledge.
Danforth, L. (1982). The death rituals of rural Greece. Princeton: New Jersey Princeton
University Press.
Dimitrakopoulos, D. (2001). Learning and steering: changing implementation pat-
terns and the Greek central government. Journal of European Public Policy, 8.4,
604e622.
Edkins, J. (2011). Missing: Persons and politics. Cornell University Press.
Edkins, J., & Pin-Fat, V. (2004). Introduction: life, power and resistance. In J. Edkins,
V. Pin-Fat, & M. J. Shapiro (Eds.), Sovereign lives: Power in global politics.
Abingdon: Routledge.
Grant, S. (2015). Migrant deaths at sea: addressing the information deﬁcit.Migration
Policy Practice, V(Number 1), 9e16. February-March 2015.
Green, S. (2012). The transnational lives of undocumented dead bodies in the
Aegean. In S. Troumpeta (Ed.), The refugee and migrant issue: Readings and
studies of borders (pp. 133e158). Athens:Papazisis[in Greek].
Hodge, P. (2015). A grievable life? The criminalisation and securing of asylum seeker
bodies in the ‘violent frames’ of Australia's operation sovereign borders. Geo-
forum, 58, 122e131.
Huysmans, J. (2008). The Jargon of exceptiondon Schmitt, Agamben and the
absence of political society. International Political Sociology, 2(2), 165e183.
Interpol. (2014). Disaster victim identiﬁcation guide. Lyon: Interpol. Available at:
http://www.interpol.int/Media/Files/INTERPOL-Expertise/DVI/DVI-Guide-new-
version-2013.
Karyotis, G. (2012). Securitization of migration in Greece: process, motives, and
implications. International Political Sociology, 6(4), 390e408.
Last, T. (2015, May 12). Deaths at the borders: Database for the southern EU. Retrieved
from www.borderdeaths.org/?page_id¼11. on [5 August 2015].
Last, T., & Spijkerboer, T. (2014). Tracking deaths in the Mediterranean. In T. Brian, &
F. Laczko (Eds.), Fatal journeys tracking lives lost during migration (pp. 85e108).
Geneva: International Organization for Migration (IOM). Also available at:
http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/FatalJourneys_
CountingtheUncounted.pdf.
Mountz, A. (2015). In/visibility and the securitization of migration shaping publics
through border enforcement on islands. Cultural Politics, 11(2), 184e200.
Owens, P. (2009). Reclaiming ‘bare life’?: Against Agamben on refugees. Interna-
tional Relations, 23(4), 567e582.
Paasi, A. (2011). Borders, theory and the challenge of relational thinking. Political
Geography, 30, 62e63.
Pugliese, J. (2009). Crisis heterotopias and border zones of the dead. Continuum:
Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 23(5), 663e679.
Salter, M. (2011). Places everyone! Studying the performativity of the border. Po-
litical Geography, 30, 63e65.
Sigona, N. (2015). Campzenship: reimagining the camp as a social and political
space. Citizenship Studies, 19(1), 1e15.
Spijkerboer, T. (2013). Moving migrants, states, and rights: human rights and border
deaths. The Law & Ethics of Human Rights, 7.2, 213e242.
Squire, V. (2014). Desert ‘trash’: posthumanism, border struggles, and humanitarian
politics. Political Geography, 39, 11e21.
Tarrow, S. (1998). Power in movement. Social movements and contentious politics (2nd
ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, C. (1995). Popular contention in Great Britain, 1758e1834. Paradigm, New
Edition.
Topak, €O. E. (2014). The biopolitical border in practice: surveillance and death at the
GreeceeTurkey border zones. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,
32, 815e833.
Triandafyllidou, A., & Maroukis, T. (2012). Migrant smuggling: Irregular migration
from Asia and Africa to Europe. Palgrave Macmillan.
UNHCR. (2015). The sea route to Europe: The Mediterranean passage in the age of
refugees' Geneve. Also available at: http://www.unhcr.org/5592b9b36.html.
Verdery, K. (2000). The political lives of dead bodies: Reburial and postsocialist change.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Withnal, A. (2015). Aylan Kurdi's story: How a small Syrian child came to be washed up
on a beach in Turkey, Independent, 3 September 2015, Also avialble at: http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/aylan-kurdi-s-story-how-a-
small-syrian-child-came-to-be-washed-up-on-a-beach-in-turkey-10484588.
html.
Zagaria, V. (2012). Grave situations. The biopolitics and memory of the tombs of un-
known migrants in the Agrigento province. unpublished MA thesis.
I. Kovras, S. Robins / Political Geography 55 (2016) 40e49 49List of interviews
Interview #1 Female staff of Vostaneio Hospital (Mytilene, 30 March 2015).
Interview #2 Mayor of Lesbos, Male (Mytilene, 3 April 2015).
Interview #3 Female local activist in her 30s (Athens, 15 April 2015).
Interview #4 Female Head of Forensic Science Division of the Greek Police (Athens,
17 April 2015).
Interview #5 Female Senior Scientist in the Forensic Science of the Greek Police
(Athens, 17 April 2015).
Interview #6 Male local activist in his 30s (Mytilene, 1 April 2015).
Interview #7 Secretary General of the Greek Ministry of Justice (Athens, 15 April
2015).
Interview #8 Head of the Mytilene Charity Institutions, Male in his 60s (Mytilene, 3
April 2015).
Interview #9 Owner of funeral services Lesvos, Male in his 60s (Mytilene, 4 April
2015).
Interview #10 Local journalist, male in his 50s (Mytilene, 19 July 2013).
Interview #11 Local activist, female in her 40s (Mytilene, 16 July 2013).
Interview #12 Local doctor, male in his 30s (Mytilene, 22 July 2013).
Interview #13 Local activist, female in her 30s (Mytilene 20 July 2013).
Interview #14 Moroccan, Male in his 20s (Mytilene 16 July 2013).
Interview #15 Afghan, Male in his 20s (Mytilene 16 July 2013).Interview #16 Local activist in his 20s (Mytilene 18 July 2013).
Interview #17 Local activist in his 40s (Mytilene 18 July 2015).
Interview #18 Member of Port authority, male in his 40s (Mytillene 5 August 2013).
Interview #19 Afghan, Male in his 20s (Mytilene 26 July 2013).
Interview #20 Female activist in her 20s (Mytilene 26 July 2013).
Interview #21 Head of the Greek UNHCR(Mytilene 3 August 2013).
Interview #22 Former mayor of Lesbos (Mytilene 24 July 2013).
Interview #23 Local coroner at Vostaneio hospital (Mytilene 21 July 2013).
Interview #24 Director of social services, vostaneio hospital (Mytilene 22 July
2013).
Interview #25 Local priest in his 60s (Mytilene 23 July 2013).
Interview #26 Local activist, female in her 40s (Mytilene 25 May 2015).
Interview #27 Syrian, Male in his 50s (Mytilene 27 May 2015).
Interview #28 Secretary of the local District Attorney (Mytilene 4 April 2015).
Interview #29 Coroner, Male in his 40s (Athens 9 April 2015).
Interview #30 Syrian, Male in his 30s (Mytilene 23 July 2013).
Interview #31 Tunisian, Father of missing migrant (Tunis, 27 November 2015).
Interview #32 Tunisian, Mother of missing migrant (Kef, 29 November 2015).
Interview #33 Tunisian, Mother of missing migrant (Bizerte, 5 December 2015).
Interview #34 Tunisian, Mother of missing migrant (Tunis, 11 November 2015).
Interview #35 Greek civil servant in Lesbos registry (Mytilene 13 December 2015).
